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FORMAZIONE

1995 Dottorato in Economia, Université catholique de Louvain.
1992 Master in Matematica, Université catholique de Louvain.
1991 Master in Economia (honors), Université catholique de Louvain.
1989 Laurea in Discipline Economiche e Sociali (110 e lode), Università "Luigi Bocconi", Milano.

INCARICHI ACCADEMICI

1995 - 1996 Maitre de Conference invité, Université catholique de Louvain.
1995 - 1998 Ricercatore, Università di Brescia, (presa di servizio 12 /12/1995)
1998 - 2001 Professore associato, Università di Brescia, (presa di servizio 1/11/1998)
2001 - 2005 Chercheur qualifié du FNRS, Belgique (presa di servizio 1/11/2001- dimissioni 30/10/2005)
2005 - Professore Ordinario, Università di Brescia, (idoneità di Professore di Prima Fascia 19/7/2000, presa di servizio 1/7/2005, conferma 1/7/2008)

ALTRI INCARICHI

1999 -2001 Coordinatore Nazionale Progetto PRIN “Markets with asymmetric information”
2005- 2017 Membro del Collegio Docenti, Dottorato Milano-Pavia
2008- 2013 Membro del Comitato Editoriale, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*
2007-2012 Membro del Consiglio di Amministrazione di banche del Gruppo UBI
2012- 2016 Membro del Consiglio di Sorveglianza di UBI Banca

VISITE ACCADEMICHE (permanenza per più di una settimana)

1994 Tel Aviv University
1996 Yale University
1997 Stanford University, Tel Aviv University
1998 Université de Cergy - Pontoise, CORE
1999 Université de Cergy - Pontoise, CORE
2001 Brown University
2003, 2004 IMF, Washington
2005 Rice University
2004 - 2010 Université Paris-Dauphine
2007 – 2015 CORE, Université catholique de Louvain

ATTIVITA' DIDATTICA

Economia Politica (Laurea Triennale, Brescia, dal 2005)
Economia Industriale (Laurea Specialistica, Brescia, dal 2016)
Microeconomia (Laurea Triennale, Brescia)
Teoria dei Giochi (Laurea Triennale, Brescia)
Economia Internazionale Avanzata (Laurea specialistica, Brescia)
General Equilibrium Theory (PhD, Louvain la Neuve, Milano, Roma)
Economics of Imperfect Information (PhD, Louvain la Neuve, Milano)

ALTRE ATTIVITA' ACCADEMICHE

Presentazione in Seminari e conferenze in Europa, Israele, Stati Uniti. Invited speaker: Econometric Society European Winter Meeting (1997), Società Italiana degli Economisti (2008).
Honorary Research associate, FNRS, Belgium (dal 2005).
Referee per diverse riviste internazionali, tra cui: *Journal of Economic Theory*, *Games and Economic Behaviour*, *Review of Economic Studies*, *American Economic Review*, *Econometrica*, *Theoretical Economics*, *Economic Theory*, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*.
Supervisione o partecipazione a jury di Tesi di PhD: CORE (7 tesi), Milano (3), Warwick (2), Parigi (2)

ARTICOLI SU RIVISTE SCIENTIFICHE

1. A property of Nash equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information (with F. Forges), *Games and Economic Behavior*, 18, 159 - 175, 1997.
2. Self-fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations (with F. Forges), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 75, 338 - 406, 1997.
3. Self-fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games (with F. Forges), *Games and Economic Behavior*, 25, 292 - 310, 1998.
4. Consumer theory and Axiomatics: a note on an early contribution by Luigi Amoroso (with A. Guccione), *History of Political Economy*, 31, 587 - 589, 1999.
5. Nash - Walras Equilibria of a Large Economy (with H. Polemarchakis), *Proceedings of The National Academy of Sciences*, 97, 5675 - 5678, 2000.
6. Rules transparency and political accountability (with M. Bordignon), *Journal of Public Economics*, 80, 73 - 98, 2001.
7. A note on the incentive compatible core (with F. Forges), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 98, 179 - 188, 2001.
8. Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies (with F. Forges and A. Heifetz), *Economic Theory*, 18, 349-365, 2001.

9. Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: a survey (with F. Forges and R. Vohra),
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 38, 1-41, 2002
10. Informational Smallness and Rational Expectations (with A. Heifetz),
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 38, 197 – 218, 2002.
11. Information at Equilibrium (with H. Polemarchakis),
Economic Theory, 21, 573 –584, 2003.
12. Ferrara's cost of reproduction doctrine (with A. Guccione and M. Guidi),
Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 26, 107 – 114, 2004.
13. Two-person bargaining with Verifiable Information (with G. de Clippel),
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 40, 799 – 813, 2004.
14. Two remarks on the Inner Core (with G. de Clippel),
Games and Economic Behavior, 50, 143 – 154, 2005.
15. Production and Financial Policy under Asymmetric Information (with J. Drèze and M. Tirelli),
Economic Theory, 35, 217–231, 2007.
16. Credit Market Failures and Policies (with S. Modica),
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 11, 363 – 382, 2009.
17. An Economic Theorists' Reading of Simone Weil (with A. Heifetz)
Economics and Philosophy, 24, 191 – 204, 2008.
18. Afriat's Theorem for General Budget Sets (with F. Forges)
Journal of Economic Theory, 144, 135 – 145, 2009.
19. Markets and Contracts (with A. Bisin, J. Geanakoplos, P. Gottardi and H. Polemarchakis),
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 47, 279-288, 2011.
20. Competitive Equilibria with Private Information on Both Sides (with M.Meier and H. Polemarchakis),
Economic Theory, 55, 257-289, 2014. (0938-2259)
21. Aspiration Traps (with A.Heifetz),
Berkeley Electronic Journal of Theoretical Economics, 15, 125-142, 2015. (1935-1704)
22. Overlapping Consensus Thin and Thick: John Rawls and Simone Weil (with A.Heifetz)
Philosophical Investigations, 39, 362–384, 2016. (0190-0536)
23. Merit and Rent in a Growing Economy,
Economics Letters, 151, 107-110, 2017. (0165-1765)
24. Flourishing as Productive Tension: Theory and Model (with A.Heifetz),
Berkeley Electronic Journal of Theoretical Economics, 20, 2019. (1935-1704)

25. Minimal Parentalism (with A.Heifetz and H. Polemarchakis), *Journal of Public Economic Theory*, <https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12517>

CAPITOLI DI LIBRO

25. Knowledge at equilibrium (with H.Polemarchakis),
in Y. Shoam (ed) *Rationality and Knowledge*, Morgan-Kaufman, New-York, 211-228, 1996.
26. Three Books on Knowledge and Rationality,
Research in Economics, 51, 69 - 82, 1997.
- 276.Trade and Welfare (with T. Cordella and H. Polemarchakis),
in G. Chicchilnisky (ed) *Markets, Information and Uncertainty*, CUP, Cambridge, 322- 327, 1999.
28. Self-fulfilling mechanisms in Bayesian Games (with F. Forges) in d'Aspremont (ed) *Social Organization and Mechanism Design*, De Boek, Bruxelles, 1999.
29. Efficienza delle regole e responsabilizzazione dei politici (con M.Bordignon), in Dardanoni e Sobbrío (eds) *Istituzioni Politiche e Finanza Pubblica*, Milano, 1999.

h-INDEX (luglio 2021)
Scholar:14, Scopus: 9.

WORKING PAPERS

- WP1.Information at a Competitive Equilibrium (with H. Polemarchakis)
CORE DP 9583, 1995.
- WP2. Arbitrage and equilibrium with exchangeable risks (with A. Heifetz and H. Polemarchakis),
CORE DP 9946, 1999.
- WP3. Shareholder-efficient production plans in a multiperiod economy (with J. Dreze and O. Lachiri)
CORE DP 2007/82, 2007.
- WP4. Stock prices, anticipations and investment in general equilibrium (with J. Dreze and O. Lachiri)
CORE DP 2009/83, 2009.
- WP5. The Big Auction (with M. Meier), 2016.
- WP6. Vitality (with A. Heifetz), 2015.
- WP7. Relational Games (with A.Heifetz), 2017.
- WP8. Ideas in General Equilibrium (with H. Polemarchakis), 2018.

Brescia, Luglio 2021

Enrico Minelli